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WELFARE STATE OR WELFARE COURT: 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
Sheila Jasanoff & Dogan Perese* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark 
evidence ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,1 
much ink has been spilled on how best to incorporate scientific and 
technical evidence into legal decisions. Interestingly, all concerned 
agree that the causes of the problem lie somewhere outside the 
courtroom door, although attorneys, scholars, and litigants by no 
means agree on just where in relation to that door—in particular, 
whether inside or outside it—to locate their proposed remedies. 
Corporate defendants have largely accepted the view that the 
problem has to do with importing “junk science”2 into the 
                                                          
 * Sheila Jasanoff is Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology 
Studies at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dogan 
Perese is a second-year student at Harvard Law School. 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
2 See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk 
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1638-39 (1993) (summarizing one 
author’s definition of “junk science” as “the mirror image of real science . . . 
cut[ting] across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering . . . . It 
is a catalog of every conceivable error: data dredging, wishful thinking, 
truculent dogmatism, and now and again, outright fraud”). See also Kara-Anne 
Yaren, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: Frankenfears: A Call for 
Consistency, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 149 (2001) (noting that 
although “there is no precise definition of ‘junk science’ there is a useful 
definition of a scientifically valid methodology: whether the theory in question 
can be (and) . . . has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or 
potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling 
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courtroom. Accordingly, industry’s preferred solution is to insist, 
as Daubert did, on proactive judicial gate-keeping at the pretrial 
stage.3 Judges, on this view, have a duty to ensure that only good 
science makes its way past a Daubert hearing to technically 
untutored and possibly too credulous juries. Just as passionately, 
much of the plaintiffs’ bar believes that the causes of the problem 
lie considerably further back in time than the pretrial phase, as well 
as spatially further away from the legal process, in varieties of 
corporate misconduct that only jury trials can adequately sanction, 
for instance, in sometimes willful disregard for citizens, 
consumers, and workers; in the refusal to carry out timely research 
on health, safety and environmental problems; and in the 
sponsorship of biased and misleading research. Where defendants 
wave the red flag of “junk science,” plaintiffs point to the 
notorious example of “tobacco science,” studies commissioned by 
the tobacco industry in an effort to demonstrate that cigarette 
smoke, one of the most securely established of all cancer-causing 
agents, poses no health risks to humans. 
In this paper, we too trace the reasons for science’s 
unsatisfactory engagement with the law to places outside the 
courtroom, only our analysis treats the law-science relationship in 
the United States as an epiphenomenon of a dynamic that reaches 
deeply into political culture. Further, we suggest that the problem 
of law and science in modern industrial democracies cannot be 
divorced from the deeper problem of responding justly and 
efficiently to the residual risks created by technological activity. 
The latter issue, moreover, is handled very differently in different 
national legal and policy systems. Our focus here is on America’s 
unique reliance on litigation to frame and find remedies for health 
problems allegedly caused by human negligence or error in private 
                                                          
its operation, and whether it has attracted wide spread acceptance within a 
relevant community”). 
3 See, e.g., Gen. Elec Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (establishing a 
discretionary standard of review for reviewing trial court’s determination of 
expert qualifications where industry sought review of trial court’s decision to 
allow unreliable expert testimony); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the Daubert requirements to include all expert 
testimony). 
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enterprise. Using evidence from other countries, we argue that 
providing legislative solutions to such problems would reduce the 
litigation burden on United States courts. In the process, courts 
would also be relieved of a high percentage of the difficult expert 
conflicts that currently occupy their time and drain their resources. 
The example we use to illustrate these points is United States 
asbestos litigation over approximately the past quarter-century. 
Comparing the American record on this issue with that of several 
European countries, we suggest that asbestos lawsuits have forced 
the United States court system to perform the redistributive 
functions of a welfare state, only at higher cost and with greater 
inefficiency than if the state had chosen simply to compensate 
asbestos victims directly.4 Our argument goes beyond the frequent 
critique of litigation as an economically inefficient means of 
redistribution and calls attention to its deficiencies as a device for 
rendering justice under conditions of inadequate knowledge and 
endemic uncertainty. 
Put differently, we suggest that courts are inefficient 
distributors of welfare benefits not only because the legal process 
is too expensive in general terms, but more specifically because 
adjudication uses the act of making causal determinations as a 
conduit, or an obligatory point of passage, to redistribution. This is 
a particularly wasteful strategy in cases like asbestos, where the 
cost of individualized fact-finding has prompted large aggregated 
proceedings, with the somewhat perverse result of compensating 
more uncertain causal claims at relatively higher rates than more 
certain ones. In both this and similar cases, experience from other 
countries suggests that more equitable and socially acceptable 
outcomes could be arrived at without channeling the compensatory 
process through the bottleneck of case-by-case fact-finding—or 
seeking creative ways around that bottleneck. Public law 
frameworks would have the merit of focusing more directly on the 
injuries to be compensated than on the often uncertain causal chain 
that connects claimed injuries to the private behaviors that 
allegedly caused them. 
                                                          
4 See generally Laurie Kazan-Allen, Asbestos Compensation in Europe, 
INTERNATIONAL BAN ASBESTOS SECRETARIAT, May 30, 2000. 
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We do not address whether the different compensation systems 
considered in this paper arrive at optimal valuations of the cost of 
disease or injury for particular conditions and claimants. In other 
words, we do not ask whether mesothelioma or asbestosis are 
compensated at too high or too low a rate in the United States or 
elsewhere. The more general point we make is that judgments like 
these should be, at bottom, a matter of political deliberation in 
democratic nations. And to make such assessments, the relative 
openness and transparency of the legislative process is 
institutionally better suited than substitutes crafted by a no matter 
how ingenious judiciary. 
I. ONE PROBLEM, MANY MANIFESTATIONS 
Asbestos is the generic name for a variety of naturally 
occurring mineral fibers once widely used as fire retardants in 
construction and consumer products, including building insulation, 
ship-building, asbestos cement piping, brake linings, fireproof 
textiles, and even home hair dryers.5 Already in the 1920s, 
employers began to notice higher incidences of lung disease and 
cancer among asbestos workers. By the 1970s, surmise turned into 
science as those initial observations hardened into published 
epidemiological findings.6 Asbestos exposure was responsible for 
causing degenerative and eventually fatal lung disease, as well as 
several kinds of cancer, including one, mesothelioma, that was 
exclusively associated with asbestos and similar fibrous materials.7 
Population-based studies made it possible to conjecture how many 
additional cases, and of which kinds, might be expected over time. 
                                                          
5 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Asbestos: General Information, at 
http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/help.html (Mar. 9, 2004). There are six major types 
of asbestos fiber, of which the most frequently used are chrysotile, a member of 
the serpentine mineral family, amosite, and crocidolite, both belonging to the 
amphibole group. Id. 
6 See generally IRVING J. SELIKOFF, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (Academic 
Press 1978). See also, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration: Safety and Health Topics: Asbestos, at http://www.osha.gov/ 
SLTC/asbestos/index.html (last revised Aug. 28, 2003). 
7 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5. 
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Yet these predictions repeatedly underestimated the actual 
incidence of disease, as new classes of exposed persons were 
identified and asbestos-induced illness appeared even in people 
exposed to the substance outside of occupational contexts. 
In general, the United States court system does relatively well 
at settling claims when the nature and causes of injury are well 
understood and the damages are clear, as for instance in routine 
automobile accidents. In the case of asbestos, abundant evidence 
documented the connections between exposure and disease; 
mesothelioma in particular was a signature disease, associated only 
with asbestos. Why then did asbestos litigation prove to be such an 
intractable problem for American courts? A major corporate 
mishap of recent years offers a number of clues. In 1998, the huge 
oil and gas services company Halliburton acquired Dresser 
Industries, its main rival, thereby immediately becoming the 
largest concern in the business.8 Eager Halliburton dealmakers, 
however, did not inquire into Dresser’s legal liability from long-
dormant asbestos lawsuits. It proved to be an epic miscalculation 
for Halliburton. According to a New Yorker article, “The asbestos 
settlements devastated the company’s stock price, which fell by 
eighty percent in just over a year.”9 One can speculate in retrospect 
that there was a failure of due diligence in investigating 
outstanding legal claims against Dresser, but more important from 
our standpoint is how such massive liabilities could have been 
overlooked in the first place. What is it about asbestos–related 
injuries that can render them both so numerous and so invisible? 
Like the diseases that asbestos induces, compensation claims 
can lie hidden for many years. Long latency periods make it 
difficult to state with certainty when conditions will appear or how 
severely they will progress in given individuals. Uncertainty 
surrounds not only the timing, number, and seriousness of claims, 
but also the connection of particular claims to particular 
circumstances of exposure. Different asbestos fiber types are 
associated with different levels of risk, and more than one type 
                                                          
8 See Jane Mayer, Contract Sport, Vol. 80, Issue 1 NEW YORKER, February 
16 & 23, 2004, at 87. 
9 Id. 
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may be mixed into a particular product. Worker and consumer 
mobility impede attempts to pinpoint with accuracy how given 
claimants were exposed or how likely they are to fall ill. In short, 
even though the health impacts of asbestos are relatively well 
known in scientific terms, classes of plaintiffs and defendants 
remain indeterminate for purposes of the law, often for long 
periods of time. Under these conditions it has proved almost 
impossible to stem the tide of asbestos lawsuits or to adjudicate 
them efficiently once they have been initiated. 
To appreciate the consequences of these uncertainties for the 
American legal process, it is instructive to compare the burden of 
asbestos actions on United States courts and on courts in other 
industrial nations where asbestos has exacted similar tolls in 
disease and death. Comparative information on asbestos claims 
and recoveries, however, has to be interpreted against a backdrop 
of radical differences in state responsibility for public health 
protection and associated cultures of regulation, risk management, 
and expertise. Differences between United States and European 
litigation patterns only make sense if we take into account how 
lawsuits operate in relation to other social mechanisms for taking 
care of the victims of illness and disability. 
II. CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND LITIGATION 
Suits to recover damages for disease and injury in the United 
States play out within a health care system that is uniquely laissez 
faire by comparison with those of other industrial democracies. 
United States citizens, unlike most of their European counterparts, 
are not generally covered by national health insurance.10 Medicare 
and Medicaid, enacted in 1965 as part of the Great Society 
legislative program, provide basic coverage for older and low 
income citizens, respectively.11 The remaining majority of 
                                                          
10 Nat’l Coalition on Health Care, Health Insurance Coverage, at 
http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml (2003). 
11 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Information Resources. 
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicare/ (last modified Sept. 12, 2003). Current 
Medicare/Medicaid statistics show that there are 40.5 million enrollees in 
Medicare and 40.1 million enrollees in Medicaid. Id. 
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Americans are covered, if at all, by varying employer-funded or 
private insurance schemes, leaving a large fraction of the 
population wholly uninsured.12 A generously supported national 
research and development system, coordinated by the National 
Institutes of Health, has achieved extraordinary success in finding 
cures for individuals willing and able to pay for these results; 
striking examples include the advances made in drug treatment for 
AIDS13 and cancer over the past two decades. But while the more 
privileged have access to arguably the world’s most sophisticated 
health care system, millions enjoy no such benefits, and health 
statistics for the poorest fifth of the United States population more 
closely resemble those of developing countries than of highly 
industrialized ones. 
European countries, by contrast, provide substantially more 
equitable nationwide coverage under variously funded insurance 
programs. Universal, state-sponsored insurance is the rule, with 
emphasis on equity across individuals, possibly at the expense of 
innovation in the domain of rare illnesses and designer drugs. 
Preventive public health strategies are favored in relation to 
potentially expensive therapies, leading in turn to greater emphasis 
on clinical care in relation to biomedical research and 
development. These differences are summarized in Table 1, albeit 
in highly simplified and schematic terms that do not do justice to 
the complexities of either the United States or the varied European 
health care systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Nat’l Coalition on Health Care, supra note 10. 
13 See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE 
POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (University of California Press 1996) (accounting of 
how people with AIDS influenced the research process). 
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TABLE 1—HEALTH POLICY, CITIZENS, AND THE STATE 
 
UNITED STATES EUROPE 
Private insurance Social insurance, orchestrated by the 
state 
Coverage through employment Universal coverage, variously funded 
Worker compensation for non-white 
collar employees 
Worker compensation 
High-quality care for considerable 
fraction of population; sub-standard 
care for others 
Relative equality of care across 
individuals and regions 
Focus on science-driven cures Focus on primary care and 
prevention 
 
 
A second sphere of difference that affects both the volume and 
outcome of asbestos litigation is the role of experts within the 
judicial system. A sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between 
the common law and civil law traditions. In the former, scientific 
and technical evidence is usually supplied by party experts and 
competing claims are adjudicated through the adversary process; in 
the latter, experts are court-appointed and have a duty to provide 
impartial expertise to the presiding judges. In civil law systems, the 
judge, not the parties, decides what types of expertise are germane 
to the matter at hand, and experts are often chosen on the basis of 
their affiliation with particular institutions or professional groups. 
Judicial management of expert evidence centralizes adjudicatory 
fact-finding and lowers the costs of the process; costs are further 
contained in many jurisdictions through fixed fee schedules for 
expert witnesses. Table 2 summarizes these differences, again in 
highly simplified form. 
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TABLE 2—ROLE AND NATURE OF EXPERTISE IN THE COURTS 
 
UNITED STATES  
(COMMON LAW) 
EUROPE  
(CIVIL LAW) 
Party appointed Court appointed 
Strategically chosen “Neutral” 
Stress on technical qualifications Institutional roles matter 
Adversarially examined Advisor to court 
Open to discovery Opinion giver, not subject to 
discovery 
 
It is worth noting too that the cost of fact-finding differs even 
within common law jurisdictions. Britain patterns with other 
European nations, and not with the United States, in barring 
contingency fees and adopting the rule that the loser of a lawsuit 
ordinarily pays the winner’s costs. Such measures create high 
threshold barriers for plaintiffs and may inhibit potentially 
legitimate as well as frivolous claims, but they reduce the overall 
amount and cost of litigation. 
III. ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
Researchers have estimated that over 100 million people in the 
United States were occupationally exposed to asbestos during the 
twentieth century.14 This includes the 27.5 million Americans 
estimated to be exposed to asbestos between 1940 and 1980.15 At 
least 600,000 individuals have filed claims for harm resulting from 
asbestos exposure and, because individuals typically file such 
claims against multiple defendants, the total number of claims is 
actually much larger.16 In the year 2000 alone, 12 large 
                                                          
14 AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND 
TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/mono_dec01asbestos.pdf. 
15 Id. 
16 Michelle J. White, Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation: 
Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 
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corporations reported that 520,000 new asbestos claims were filed 
against them.17 Insurers of asbestos defendants have paid an 
estimated $32 billion in compensation to claimants; the result of 
such costly liability has led about 80 firms to file for bankruptcy, 
30 of which filed since early 2000.18 
Defendants’ bankruptcies, however, have not dissuaded further 
asbestos mass tort claims as might have been expected. Instead, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are filing even more claims on behalf of 
claimants whose injuries are less severe and against defendants 
whose involvement with asbestos production is increasingly 
tangential. With an effectively limitless supply of both plaintiffs 
and defendants, asbestos has earned the distinction of being the 
largest mass tort in United States legal history.19 Two recent 
predictions of its total cost came out at $200 and $275 billion, 
suggesting that asbestos may end up costing more than Superfund, 
the most costly environmental program run by the United States 
federal government.20 
Asbestos litigation has evolved from a once regional issue into 
a national one and as courts modify their handling of increasingly 
numerous cases, claimants predictably seek fora in which they can 
achieve speedy resolution with a maximum payout and a minimum 
of litigation time and cost. In the early days of United States 
asbestos litigation (1970–1987), 60 percent of state court asbestos 
personal injury cases were filed in four states: California, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois.21 By 1998–2000, however, 
filings of asbestos cases in these states accounted for only 7 
percent of the total.22 At the other extreme, five states—
Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, Ohio, and Texas—that had 
accounted for 9 percent of the cases filed before 1988 accounted 
                                                          
9362 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9362.pdf. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND 
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (Rand 2002). 
22 Id. 
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for 66 percent of filings between 1998 and 2000.23 In part, the 
cases track legal changes easing plaintiffs’ access to the courts. In 
California, for example, section 340.2 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure gives priority for trial scheduling to all plaintiffs with a 
terminal illness, allowing plaintiffs with mesothelioma to get to 
trial quickly.24 Similarly, New York City has a special expedited 
trial schedule for asbestos plaintiffs with mesothelioma and other 
cancers.25 Under Mississippi rules, trial courts lack the authority to 
order independent medical examinations of plaintiffs, limiting 
defendants’ ability to challenge asbestos plaintiffs’ disease 
allegations.26 In Texas, where asbestos cases are dispersed over 
multiple jurisdictions and there are many different law firms 
representing plaintiffs, defendants who are named on thousands of 
cases may be noticed on the same day for scores of trials in a 
dozen or more jurisdictions.27 All these factors place special 
settlement pressures on defendants, leading to a greater number of 
settlements than might otherwise be anticipated. 
Over the last decade, the annual number of claims filed against 
most United States defendants has increased substantially, with 
some defendants seeing claims double in a single year. The 
number of defendants named by the typical claimant is also 
increasing. In the early 1980s, claimants typically named about 20 
different defendants; by the mid-1990s, that number may have 
risen to 60 to 70 defendants.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Id. 
24 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 340.2 (Deering 2004). 
25 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21. 
26 Swan v. I.P., Inc., 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993). 
27 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21. 
28 DEBORAH R. HANSLER ET. AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING 
PUBLIC GOODS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 56 (1999), at http://www.rand.org/ 
publications/MR/MR969/. 
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TABLE 3—U.S. ASBESTOS LITIGATION, 1982 AND 2002 
 
 1982 2002 
Number of claimants 21,000 600,000 
Number of defendants 300 6,000 
Average number of defendants per 
claimant 
20 60-70 
Total costs to date  
(nominal) 
$1 billion $54 billion 
Bankruptcies 3 80 
Estimated total future costs 
(nominal) 
$38 billion $145-275 billion 
 
About two-thirds of United States plaintiffs whose claims 
reached final verdict through trial from 1993 to 2001 won an 
award, somewhat higher than the rate of plaintiff success 
nationally in all tort suits, and substantially higher than the rate of 
plaintiff success in product liability suits in many metropolitan 
jurisdictions.29 Mesothelioma plaintiffs were most likely to be 
successful, but more than half of the claims for conditions other 
than cancer and asbestosis also succeeded.30 
The mean verdict for successful plaintiff claims over the period 
was about $1.8 million, but mean awards varied substantially by 
disease category, from $322 thousand for nonmalignant diseases 
other than asbestosis to $3.8 million for mesothelioma. The mean 
award for successful asbestosis claims topped $1.6 million. The 
mean award for successful mesothelioma claims rose dramatically 
from about $2 million in 1998 to upwards of $6 million in 2001, 
while the mean award for successful asbestosis claims increased 
five-fold, from $1 million in 1999 to $5 million in 2001. Just over 
half of the plaintiffs whose claims reached verdict were awarded 
several hundred thousand dollars or more. About one-quarter of the 
successful plaintiffs were awarded in excess of a million dollars. 
As in most tort litigation, a smallish number of very large awards 
                                                          
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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account for the majority of all the money awarded.31 
The Claims Resolution Management Corporation, an 
organization which monitors the disbursement of asbestos claims 
and advises prospective litigants, recently published the 
distribution of the Manville Trust’s claims payments by disease 
category from 1995 through 2001.32 According to these data, 
mesothelioma claims accounted for about four percent of the total 
claims paid by the Trust over that period.33 About 20 percent of the 
dollars paid by the Trust over the same period went to 
mesothelioma claimants, whereas about 8 percent were for cancers 
other than mesothelioma; that group received about 16 percent of 
the dollars.34 Interestingly, nonmalignant claims accounted for 
about 88 percent of claims and 64 percent of dollars paid out.35 
IV. JUDICIAL INNOVATION AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Asbestos claims are concentrated in a few courts and the 
volume of claims in these courts makes it infeasible to hold 
individual trials for all claimants. To help stem judicial gridlock, 
judges have responded by developing innovative procedures 
intended to resolve large numbers of cases at minimal cost in court 
time.36 One notable procedural innovation is consolidated trials, 
which are trials of multiple asbestos claims held simultaneously 
before a single jury. The jury makes separate decisions for each 
plaintiff against each defendant. Another such innovation is 
bifurcation, which divides the trial into two or more phases. In 
bifurcated trials, the jury decides liability in the first phase and 
damages in the second, while in reverse bifurcated trials the order 
is switched. After phase one, the judge suspends trial and directs 
the parties to negotiate a settlement, sometimes becoming closely 
                                                          
31 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 21. 
32 David Austern, “THE MANVILLE TRUST EXPERIENCE,” MEALY’S 
ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE (Claims Resolution Management 
Corporation, Fairfax, VA, 2001). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 White, supra note 16. 
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involved in the negotiations. For instance, the judge may threaten 
that, if the parties cannot reach a settlement, she will direct the jury 
to consider punitive damages. A third innovation is the “bouquet” 
trial in which a small group of cases is selected for trial from a 
larger group that may include thousands of cases. At the end of the 
bouquet trial, the judge directs the parties to settle the larger group 
of cases based on the result of the small group outcomes. If 
negotiations do not result in settlement, the judge may threaten to 
use the same jury to decide additional cases in the large group.37 
 White provides a few notable examples of such innovations in 
action. In 1998, a reverse bifurcated bouquet trial of 12 plaintiffs’ 
asbestos claims in Mississippi resulted in phase one compensatory 
damages totaling $48 million.38 When the judge threatened to put 
the issue of punitive damages before the same jury, the defendants 
settled the 12 cases, reportedly for the full amount of the damage 
awards.39 The judge then scheduled 63 more cases for trial before 
the same jury. The defendants submitted an emergency appeal to 
the Mississippi Supreme Court seeking to disqualify the judge for 
bias, but their appeal was denied. The defendants then settled all of 
the remaining 1,738 claims in the large group on very favorable 
terms for plaintiffs.40 In one bifurcated trial in West Virginia in 
2002 that involved 4,000 plaintiffs from 35 states suing a sole 
defendant, liability and a punitive damages multiplier were decided 
during phase one.41 The judge then instructed the parties to 
negotiate a settlement of all 4,000 claims. Although settlement 
negotiations are still ongoing, they are likely to succeed because 
the jury’s decision (in the reverse bifurcated trial) that the 
defendant must pay punitive damages of three times any 
compensatory damage award makes it extremely risky for the 
defendant to proceed to the damages phase. 
Judges’ attempts to save trial time by encouraging mass 
settlements of asbestos claims may have made the asbestos crisis 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 4. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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more severe by encouraging plaintiffs’ lawyers to flood the courts 
with additional claims, according to White.42 The following 
feedback seems to have resulted: because of the large numbers of 
claims filed in certain amenable fora, judges in these courts adopt 
procedural innovations that are intended to reduce trial time and 
encourage large numbers of cases to settle. These procedural 
innovations also change trial outcomes in a pro-plaintiff 
direction.43 When large numbers of asbestos claims are settled on 
favorable terms for plaintiffs, then plaintiffs’ lawyers find it 
profitable to file additional claims in the same courts. This worsens 
the gridlock and pressures judges to continue innovating. The 
threat of thousands of claimants free-riding on reduced per-capita 
evidentiary scrutiny pressures defendants to settle even when many 
claimants are asymptomatic or may have potentially faulty claims. 
The cost of responding to uncertainty across the board tends to 
increase payouts for lesser claims and reduce available funds for 
truly meritorious victims with demonstrable illnesses, though 
these, ironically, are the easiest cases to make in individualized 
proceedings. Furthermore, once damages can be recovered even in 
the face of increased uncertainty, the number of potential plaintiffs 
and potential defendants widens again and, as a result, the asbestos 
mass tort keeps snowballing. 
Thus, though United States courts have been extremely 
ingenious in devising ways to deal with thousands of claimants at 
once, thus reducing the astronomical costs of individual fact-
finding, the perverse result of such innovation has been a 
preemptive allocation of defendants’ funds to the relatively 
uncertain realm of nonmalignant claims, possibly at the expense of 
more demonstrably meritorious claims. In a 1994 review, Durkin 
and Felstiner characterized the outcome of asbestos-related disease 
(ARD) litigation as having failed to provide adequate mechanisms 
of compensation to sufferers, despite strong incentives for all sides 
to reach resolution.44 “The failed attempts [at various strategic 
                                                          
42 White, supra note 16. 
43 Id. 
44 Thomas Edward Durkin & William L. Felstiner, Bad Arithmetic: 
Disaster Litigation as Less than the Sum of its Parts, in LEARNING FROM 
DISASTER 158 (Jasanoff ed., 1994). 
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efforts by the parties] provide evidence that what occurred in the 
United States overall was more a series of unrelated attempts to 
shift financial responsibility than it was cumulative ‘learning.’”45 
V. COURT-PROVIDED ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF 
A controversial creation of a few bankruptcy courts was the 
settlement trust for asbestos claims, most notably the Manville 
Personal Injury Settlement Trust.46 Thought by some to be the 
solution to mass toxic torts, such trusts were to provide 
compensation, superior claims-handling efficiency, equity between 
similar claims, and decreased transaction costs.47 Settlement trusts, 
however, soon proved problematic: bargaining for the Manville 
trust began in 1982, but it did not begin payments to claimants 
until 1988. Furthermore, even though the trust began with $1.7 
billion in liquid assets, it was rapidly overwhelmed with claims, 
settlements that ran 50 percent higher than projections, and a faster 
pace of settlements than predicted.48 
Victims in the United States who used asbestos, rather than 
worked in manufacturing industries, have had the choice of relying 
on worker compensation (from employers like shipyards) or 
pursuing tort claims. Victims have largely chosen not to rely on 
worker compensation, since compensation claims paid 
significantly less than tort recoveries and were vulnerable to many 
of the same defenses.49 As early as the mid-1980s, Hensler et al. 
highlighted the drawbacks presented by workers’ compensation: 
Many of the problems we have noted about the tort system, 
including timing of claims, standards for proving causation, 
and issues arising out of the involvement of multiple 
defendants have not been solved by state workers’ 
compensation systems either. In addition, workers’ 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 159. 
47 Id. at 159-63. 
48 Id. at 167. 
49 ROBERT I. FIELD & RICHARD B. VICTOR, ASBESTOS CLAIMS: THE 
DECISION TO USE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND TORT (Workers’ 
Compensation Research Institute 1988). 
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compensation systems have usually provided less than full 
compensation of wage loss, and no compensation for pain 
and suffering.50 
Given the above, the current state of United States asbestos 
litigation is not surprising. A claimant, possibly having to 
surmount a similar burden of proof for state-provided welfare, in 
this case workers’ compensation, or a regulated trust, or a tort 
claim, will pursue the tort claim when the payoff is substantially 
greater and the court system actually facilitates the bringing of 
such claims. Even when uncertain about symptoms, the record of 
past litigation and a well-trodden path to innovative courts is likely 
to continue providing potential claimants with a positive incentive 
to file suit. 
VI. EUROPE: FEWER CLAIMS, LOWER COMPENSATION 
In Europe, asbestos claims have been fewer in number and 
have been compensated at significantly lower rates than in the 
United States.51 These settlements do not necessarily represent 
more just solutions in individual cases, especially for the most 
gravely injured plaintiffs. At the same time, the press of asbestos 
litigation has not converted the judicial system from its normal 
adjudicatory functions into serving as a de facto substitute for a 
legislatively and administratively managed health care system. 
Up until the end of 1986, the ratio of asbestos-related civil 
actions in the United Kingdom compared to the United States was 
1:5 even though there were proportionally nearly four times as 
many cases of mesothelioma in the United Kingdom. Figures cited 
by the firm Norton Rose from 1992-1996 show the average 
mesothelioma victim was sixty years old and received $158,660 
(compared to the 2001 average of $6 million for successful United 
States mesothelioma claimants), the average asbestosis victim was 
also sixty years old and received $108,465, and the average lung 
                                                          
50 HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS 
TOXIC TORTS (Rand 1985). 
51 Laurie Kazan-Allen, Asbestos Compensation in Europe, INTERNATIONAL 
BAN ASBESTOS SECRETARIAT, May 30, 2000. 
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cancer victim was sixty-five years old and received $93,340.52 
These numbers are far lower than even the lowest United States 
average of $322,000 awarded for nonmalignant diseases. 
French courts require that claimants surmount a high burden of 
proof, demonstrating defendants guilty of “faute inexcusable,” or 
outrageous misconduct. A successful case brought by 11 claimants 
resulted in the doubling of disability benefits and an award of 
$26,000 each.53 In 2000, the French government established the 
Compensation Fund for Victims of Asbestos Exposure (FIVA), a 
no-fault benefit system to provide automatic compensation for 
victims of both occupational and non-occupational exposure to 
asbestos; this program is expected to be operational in 2003.54 
 
TABLE 4—AWARDS, BURDENS OF PROOF, AND PENDING CASES 
 
 Mesothelioma 
Mean Award 
Asbestosis 
Mean 
Award 
Burden 
of Proof 
for State-
Provided 
Welfare 
Burden 
of Proof 
for Tort 
Claims 
Pending 
Civil 
Cases 
(est.) 
U.S. (1993-
2001) 
$3.8 million $1.6 
million 
High High 100,000
s 
U.K. (1992-
1996) 
$159,000 $108,000 Low High 1,000s 
Netherlands $50,000-
$80,000 
N/A/ Low High 100s 
 
In the Netherlands, where total pending civil cases number in 
the hundreds, only 10-15 percent is likely to reach court and 
successful claimants have been awarded $50,000-$80,000 for 
mesothelioma.55 Unlike the United States courts, their Dutch 
counterparts have not made substantial changes to expedite the 
processing of claims. In order to streamline the compensation 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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process, however, the Institute of Asbestos Victims (IAV) was set 
up in 2000; the culmination of years of lobbying by the Dutch 
Committee of Asbestos Victims. Established in 1995 “to secure 
justice and compensation for all asbestos victims,” the group 
obtained the cooperation of employers, insurers, and the 
government.56 Asbestos victims entitled to apply to the IAV are 
limited to mesothelioma patients with traceable employers/insurers 
whose exposure occurred within a thirty year limitation period. 
Interestingly, the IAV tries to resolve claims within four months, 
and to bring a claim before the IAV, individuals must renounce the 
right to bring a civil action. This combination of an alternative, 
speedy method of claim resolution with a relatively transparent 
burden of proof and an average award of $45,000-$50,000 is 
attractive to Dutch claimants when compared to the numbers of 
claims successfully brought in court, the time and risk of litigation, 
and corresponding awards that are not significantly more 
remunerative. The IAV is incapable of dealing with all of 
Holland’s asbestos victims as its rules bar asbestosis, lung cancer 
and the 30 percent of mesothelioma patients whose exposure took 
place more than thirty years ago. Disqualified victims can apply to 
the Government Asbestos Institute (GAI), a tripartite body which 
administers a national compensation scheme. Average settlements 
of $17,700 are awarded by the GAI.57 
CONCLUSION 
One great virtue of the common law system is its ability to 
carry out case-specific causal determinations, driven by the parties’ 
desire to establish the facts most relevant to their cases. The history 
of asbestos litigation, and of mass torts more generally,58 shows 
how this very strength can turn into a source of weakness when 
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 Jans, Van Den Bogaard & Locher, The Monitoring and Enforcement of 
the Asbestos Policy in the Netherlands, in 19 SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS 
DISEASES (Michie 1980-2000). 
58 See Sheila Jasanoff, Science and the Statistical Victim: Modernizing 
Knowledge in Breast Implant Litigation, Vol. 32, No. 1 SOCIAL STUDIES OF 
SCIENCE 37 (2002). 
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courts are confronted by litigation volumes that overwhelm their 
capacity to engage in individualized fact-finding. In the effort to 
avoid that burden, United States courts over time have 
demonstrated extraordinary innovative capacity to streamline 
procedures and consolidate cases. The perverse result of these 
measures, however, has been to encourage still more litigants to 
pursue claims based on uncertain exposure to one of the most 
pervasive, as well as most deadly, of known toxic agents in the 
human environment. Defendants, for their part, have been 
encouraged to settle the seemingly endless flood of claims, with 
results that vary arbitrarily across legal jurisdictions and classes of 
claimants. 
The sharp contrast between the United States situation and that 
in other industrial countries can be traced, in our view, to the 
state’s backstop role in providing general health and welfare 
remedies for citizens. Where those costs are to some extent 
nationalized, and disease victims are taken care of through a 
system of universal coverage, whatever the source of their injuries, 
they have less incentive to sue for damages; correspondingly, the 
state can raise the entry barriers to litigation without abandoning 
sick citizens to open-ended health care costs and inadequate relief 
for even the gravest injuries. The decoupling of compensation from 
prior causal determinations leads, we would argue, to more 
efficient, as well as potentially more egalitarian solutions in cases 
where the causes are uncertain and the effects are distributed in 
indeterminate ways, as in the asbestos case, across vast numbers of 
individuals. 
Of course, the United States courts, too, have sought in effect 
to decouple the pinpointing of cause in each individual case from 
providing across-the-board remedies to rationally grouped classes 
of claimants. The failure of court-established administrative 
mechanisms such as the Manville Trust highlights the inadequacy 
of even these seemingly efficient approaches. Lacking an effective 
basic system of health care, any person with a colorable claim to 
asbestos-induced disease has found attractive the prospect of 
turning to one or another judicially provided remedial scheme, 
whether through tort litigation or through a trust or fund. The result 
has been a snowballing of claims and no end in sight to the torrent 
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of asbestos lawsuits. 
In a zero-risk society, cases like asbestos would never arise 
because science would have the knowledge and regulators the 
foresight to prevent such threats from materializing in the first 
place. We, however, are inescapably the inhabitants of what the 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck has called “risk society”; in such 
societies the cost of progress and of desirable innovation is that 
some people will suffer adverse consequences that cannot be 
known in advance or effectively guarded against.59 The only 
humane response in democratic societies is to assume collective 
responsibility for these externalities of our communal desire for 
social and technological advancement. Judgments about how much 
to pay the victims of progress will still call for difficult decisions, 
but courts are not the places where the relevant trade-offs can be 
most fully and fairly debated. The asbestos story suggests that even 
the world’s most venturesome court system cannot efficaciously 
pick up the pieces when knowledge and foresight fail us—as they 
inevitably will continue to do, and unpredictably so, in future 
cases. 
 
                                                          
59 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Sage 
Publications 1992). 
